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The Devolution Paradigm: 
Theoretical Critiques and the Case of Kenya 
 
By Susanne D. Mueller 
 
 
Abstract. Devolution’s assumptions presume democracy, yet its proponents view it as an antidote to 
repressive centralized states, where its assumptions do not hold. This contradiction explains why 
devolution mostly reproduces the status quo rather than transforming it in transition political economies. 
Scholars have both supported and criticized devolution, while numerous donors, civil society activists, 
local politicians, and ordinary citizens still view it as a solution. Disaggregating the theoretical 
assumptions underpinning the devolution paradigm and juxtaposing them against a case study of Kenya 
demonstrates how old incentives undermine new formal legal changes and why institutional change may 
be a dependent rather than an independent variable. Thus, a range of institutional initiatives from 
organizational tinkering to devolution and constitutional engineering often fail in autocracies and nominal 
democracies. 
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Introduction 
By the late 1990s, most governments had experimented with some form of political 
devolution ranging from decentralization to federalism. It was, as one author put it, all 
“the rage” (Bardhan 2002, 185). Local critics and international organizations supported it 
as an antidote to corrupt unaccountable governments (Faguet 2014). They continue to 
herald devolution as a panacea for the many problems besetting centralized states, 
particularly in developing countries at various stages of political and economic 
transition.  Behind this positive view is a paradigm with a set of rarely discussed 
optimistic assumptions about how government works and how changing its architecture 
would improve it.  
Yet, is this optimism justified? The discussion below suggests it is not, absent 
certain pre–conditions. It highlights a significant disjuncture between the predictions of 
devolution’s enthusiasts and the reality on the ground, particularly in countries that are 
not fully democratic. Bringing government closer to citizens does not necessarily 
transform it. Instead, it may reinforce the status quo, contrary to the expectations of 
numerous practitioners and proponents.  
Below, I examine theories behind what I call the “devolution paradigm.” I outline 
the main assumptions behind the paradigm, analyze key critiques of them, and assess 
how devolution has operated in practice, concluding with a detailed analysis of Kenya’s 
experience against this backdrop. I utilize the Kenya case to illuminate the political 
mechanisms used to undermine devolution, thereby shedding light on the process itself 
and not just on the results. More generally, I argue that the political economy of the 
state affects both the validity of the assumptions behind the devolution paradigm and 
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the belief that its adoption will lead to transformative political and developmental 
outcomes. 
Theories supporting devolution often focus on the utility of changing the formal 
rules and structure of government while ignoring or underrating the norms and 
incentives of various actors seeking to undermine them. The discussion here 
emphasizes the interplay between the two, thereby highlighting the difficulties of 
institutional change, the power of the past in subverting it, and a consequent tendency 
towards “path dependence” (North 1984). It also responds to scholars who lament the 
inattention paid to governance in explaining devolution’s unexpected outcomes 
(Bardhan 2002; Faguet 2014).  
A paradigm is a worldview. It helps us understand and interpret what we see 
(Kuhn 1962). Competing paradigms in the social sciences shape analysis just as they 
do in the hard sciences. Yet, in the social sciences, paradigms often linger even when 
their assumptions no longer hold. 
Embedded in the paradigm of devolved government are a set of assumptions 
about the improved and fairer operation of government when it is less centralized and 
more decentralized (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Oates 1972; Weingast 1995). They 
suggest that if the architecture of government changes and is closer to the people it will 
become more participatory and accountable, with citizens having more information, 
greater control over officials, and improved access to resources and public goods. 
Theorists also have argued that market competition would check badly performing local 
authorities as informed and mobile citizens would then move elsewhere (Tiebout 1956; 
Oates 1999; Qian and Weingast 1997).   
The sections below highlight these insufficiently discussed assumptions, and 
raise questions about them both generally and in Kenya. Decentralization’s proponents 
have argued that subnational authorities by virtue of being smaller and closer to 
citizens, would escape the dysfunctions of national governments where they exhibit 
fragile rule of law, weak checks on executive behavior, widespread corruption, and 
political competition rooted in ethnic and other types of clientelism. In many 
circumstances, however, these problems are either similar to or worse at the 
subnational level rather than better. In part, this is because old norms and incentives 
often undermine new formal legal changes when trying to introduce change (North 
1984), entrenched political elites are more powerful than anticipated, and citizens 
frequently have fewer avenues for redress than expected.  
Thus, moving from a centralized to a devolved system of government often 
becomes a battle between the old order and the new with numerous successful 
attempts to claw back whatever seeks to undermine the status quo. Looked at this way, 
none of the optimistic predictions underlying the devolution paradigm are inherently true 
or necessarily hold. Instead, they depend on the political economy of the state in 
question. This feeds more broadly into North’s observation that adopting the formal 
rules of one political economy will result in very different performance characteristics in 
another because of different norms, incentives, and enforcement mechanisms that 
shape actors’ choices (North 1984, 366). Hence, the outcome of introducing devolution 
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in Canada and Outer Mongolia is likely to be different. This reality raises broader 
questions about the role of institutional change and the conditions propelling or derailing 
it. 
The Historical Roots of Devolution 
A standard definition of decentralization is “the devolution by central government of 
specific functions … to regional and local governments that are independent of the 
center within given geographic and functional domains” (Faguet 2014, 3).  
Devolution can take different forms ranging from various degrees of 
decentralization to federalism (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Its historical roots are varied. 
Principal among them is the idea of self-government operating best if it is closer to the 
people with power shared between central and local authorities, especially in societies 
with a large land mass, a large population, and diverse regional characteristics. Here 
federalism in Canada and the United States come to mind, as do examples from Brazil, 
Germany, Switzerland, Argentina, Australia, India, Pakistan and South Africa, among 
others. However, there also are other forms of devolution encompassing different types 
and degrees of decentralized power in political systems with different characteristics. 
In Africa, governments mostly have been highly centralized in part due to the 
imposition of colonial rule and the desire of Africa’s new rulers to keep that power intact. 
Yet, factions of the political class also have supported devolution when it dovetailed with 
their changing political interests, as the examples below suggest.  
Kenya’s federal constitution at independence in 1963, known as “majimboism,” 
and consisting of eight regions with their own elected assemblies, ended within one 
year after which government became increasingly centralized. Yet, the yearning for 
federalism never totally died. Before independence, Kenya’s smaller ethnic groups, and 
their political party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), supported federalism. 
They feared Kenya’s larger ethnic communities, particularly the Kikuyu and Luo, would 
overpower and marginalize them. These same ethnic groups controlled the 
independence movement and its political party, the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU). Hence, the fears of ethnic domination persisted as government became more 
centralized and the power of the president increased. Later, as state repression 
mounted, opposition politicians, supported by civil society, promoted federalism while 
they were out of power to check executive authority. However, they themselves were 
less keen to devolve central government’s authority once they were in power. 
Following independence and a civil war, Uganda adopted a decentralized 
government with local Resistance Councils (RCs) after President Yoweri Museveni 
came to power in 1986. One rationale was to provide Museveni with a political antidote 
to former President Milton Obote’s powerful civil service inherited from the colonial 
period, known as the provincial administration. While the RCs introduced a system of 
elected local authorities, another of its aims was to act as government’s eyes and ears 
in the countryside and to reduce the dominance of the provincial administration’s old 
guard. 
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Apart from the above, pressure for decentralization in Africa largely came from 
civil society activists and from aid donors beginning in the 1990s after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. By this time, there were widespread internal and external demands for 
democratization to curtail central government repression and corruption, to increase 
local participation, and to improve accountability. Both the World Bank and various 
United Nations agencies began to promote decentralization to improve the delivery of 
their aid and to increase transparency (World Bank 2014), becoming some of its most 
“fervent advocates”(Grindle 2007, 5). Initially, this included bypassing centralized 
governments by using local civil society and non-governmental organizations and later 
by promoting decentralization. Donors supporting devolution often proposed 
administrative and technical “capacity building” solutions for what in reality were political 
problems.  
Notwithstanding the need for improved aid delivery and transparency more 
generally, the desire to promote or stifle various forms of decentralization had a political 
impetus and generally did not stem from evidence about its broader utility or feasibility 
as the above examples from Kenya, Uganda, and donor driven initiatives all 
demonstrate.  
Positive Assumptions  
Devolution’s advocates believe it improves government and promotes democracy. Yet, 
the assumptions underpinning the devolution paradigm mostly depend on the existence 
of democracy, including its basic freedoms and the rule of law. Hence, there is a 
contradiction between the assumptions, initially discussed by scholars of federalism and 
decentralization in advanced democracies (Oates 1972; Weingast 1995), and the 
conditions necessary for them to work elsewhere (Boone 2003; Rodden and Rose-
Ackerman 1997).  
The first assumption is that the law fundamentally shapes institutional 
performance. Hence, the focus on constitutional engineering without taking into account 
government’s willingness to enforce the law or other factors. The emphasis on the law 
and institutions stems from early works in U.S. public administration known as “formal 
legal” analysis (Sait 1938; Friedrich 1968). Its proponents mainly understood 
government as a set of structures and functions flowing from different types of formal 
legal institutional arrangements rather than from the informal incentives of powerful 
actors with conflicting interests who might subvert rather than support the law.  
The second assumption is that under devolution citizens would have greater 
access to local information and greater opportunities to participate, leading to better 
oversight and accountability over local politicians and administrators. The anticipated 
result would be positive changes in the behavior of citizens and officials, leading to 
improved outcomes. Yet, many of the conditions and basic freedoms necessary to act 
on that information to check officials and politicians, including the freedom to do so 
without retribution, do not always exist.  
A third assumption is that the incentives of local policy makers would make them 
less prone to clientelism, ethnic favoritism, and corruption than their national 
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counterparts; they would be among their own and subject to greater checks on their 
authority, including from social norms and elections. Hence, the belief that the allocation 
of public sectors goods and other outcomes would improve under devolution with 
citizens getting more of what they wanted, less of what they did not want, and feeling 
less marginalized than before. However, the assumption concerning improved local 
incentives does not necessarily hold. Politicians often have an even freer hand in small 
rural societies than they do nationally as citizens lack anonymity, surveillance of them is 
easier, and they may fear reprisals from officials, whose power may go unchecked. 
Additionally, even in more ethnically homogeneous devolved authorities, clientelism is 
operative. Politicians often favor their home areas and clans (Sheely 2018) or support 
national government preferences over those of citizens to obtain favors for themselves. 
Furthermore, in many parts of the world, citizens’ mobility is limited legally or by socio-
economic factors, including access to land or the desire to be among one’s own, with 
dissatisfaction not necessarily leading to mobility or competition among devolved 
authorities (Levy 2007, 459–60). 
Critiques of Assumptions  
Behind the assumptions just outlined are expectations about the power of formal legal 
changes inducing actual changes in structure, political behavior, and substance.  
Against these positive assumptions critics argue that legal changes to promote 
devolution often are undermined by entrenched powers and interests determined to 
maintain the status quo and that the much heralded bottom may engage in behavior 
that is similar to or worse than the top. This explains why constitutional change, 
improved information, and other theoretical legal checks do not automatically induce 
new behavior and better outcomes and why old behavioral patterns often persist and 
undermine new legal changes (North, 1984; Mueller 1984, 2014). Juxtaposed against 
these realities, the positive assumptions behind the devolution paradigm seem overly 
optimistic, if not Rousseauean.  
First, in spite of a legal devolution of power, some countries have experienced a 
recentralization of state power or “state capture” instead (Ribot et. al. 2005). Political 
elites do not necessarily support the legal spirit of devolution and may instead 
undermine it. Governments have a variety of ways of strangling lower level devolved 
authorities, including starving them of funds, creating more and more units that are 
fiscally and substantively unviable, or simply buying off local elites (Grossman and 
Lewis 2014). Argentina provides a reverse example of powerful provincial governors, 
with strong clientelistic networks and limited competition, capturing the state and 
national politics to the detriment of democracy and accountability (Ardanaz et. al. 2014). 
Second, even when power is successfully devolved, local governments 
sometimes become a form of “decentralized despotism” with government officials at the 
bottom behaving the same as those at the top (Mamdani 1996). The assumption of 
various forms of citizen checks on local politicians may not happen either because the 
costs of doing so are too high or because of clientelism and collusion. These tendencies 
are accentuated in rural settings where politicians with considerable power are 
supported by local and national administrators leaving citizens with little regress and 
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fearing sanctions if they object. In such cases, the bottom may be no better than the 
top, but instead a microcosm of it, demonstrating that it is part of the same political 
economy. The bottom, like the top, is full of cleavages and disparities in power that can 
and often do undermine the way devolved authorities operate in practice. Hence, many 
of the assumed checks on local authorities fail to operate as anticipated for the same 
reasons as they do nationally: insufficient information, complicity, and fear. 
Third, rather than inducing greater fiscal integrity, devolution may increase 
corruption. If the assumed conditions of devolution’s success including formal legal 
checks on local politicians from citizens, the law, social sanctions and elections do not 
hold, devolution may increase fiscal irresponsibility rather than accountability (Fan et al. 
2009). Corruption then may worsen under devolution due to the combined proliferation 
of lower level units and a lack of oversight. Even citizens aware of increasing corruption 
by local officials in devolved governments may not act on it: because they are 
beneficiaries themselves, because information about corrruption’s pervasiveness makes 
them want to join in rather than halt it (Corbacho et al., 2016), or because they fear 
retribution. Furthermore, if citizens possess information but do not check politicians as 
the paradigm assumes, then there are few incentives for politicians to behave differently 
or better than their national counterparts do. Even losing elections may not be sufficient 
to improve behavior if the short–term financial rewards from various types of rent 
seeking are high enough.  
Fourth, findings from different parts of the world suggest that devolution may 
propel rather than improve political and economic discrimination against ethnic and 
religious minorities thereby further marginalizing them (Manby 2009). As lower level 
units increase, often becoming more homogeneous, so do the number of 
majority/minority situations, leading to new groups of marginalized citizens. Additionally, 
there may be political motives for both local and central politicians to favor co-ethnics 
(Hassan and Sheely 2017; Grossman and Lewis 2014), with clientelism thereby 
undermining the anticipated checks on power. 
Fifth, as all of the above implies, greater public goods, better service delivery and 
other assumed positive outcomes do not automatically improve under devolution. They 
can, but also may worsen, particularly if lower level units are sufficiently unviable, 
corrupt, and do not fear legal accountability from government or citizens.  
General Findings 
Scholars examining devolution in practice have produced an impressive critical 
literature (Treisman 2007; Faguet 2014; Bardhan 2002; Weingast 2014). However, they 
have not fully spelled out the theories, implications, and critiques of the devolution 
paradigm or juxtaposed them against a case study, as is the intention here. Yet, their 
findings suggest that the positive assumptions behind the devolution paradigm 
discussed above do not automatically hold. In short, changing the architecture of 
government does not necessarily change its substance; the bottom is not inherently 
preferable to the top; and devolution does not guarantee better information more 
participation, increased accountability, a reduction in ethnic favoritism, or improvements 
in the distribution of public goods. 
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There is some consensus around the following: 
First countries that introduce various types and levels of devolution do it for different 
reasons ranging from mitigating violence and ethnic tensions in Columbia, South Africa, 
and Ethiopia to improving democracy in Great Britain, to gaining greater control, among 
other motives (Faguet 2014, 2). 
Second, the outcomes of similar types of devolution may take on the characteristics of 
the systems themselves rather than transforming them. Introducing devolution in 
economically advanced democracies is likely to work better than in autocracies or in 
transition political economies. The motives and outcomes of introducing federalism in 
Canada are likely to differ from those in the former Soviet Union, China, Argentina, and 
India for different reasons.  
Established democracies, even with all their challenges, shortcomings, and 
deficiencies, have greater incentives to make devolution effective and accept the 
procedures that are likely to enhance it in contrast to systems where the formal legal 
changes are not enforced. These procedures include the rule of law, checks and 
balances of power, independent courts, and competitive elections to hold officials 
accountable. Advanced democracies also have programmatic political parties and civil 
society interest groups. Along with a free press, they have the freedom to organize and 
put pressure on government to act in accordance with the law and more fairly distribute 
public goods with little fear of retribution. Given the above, Faguet’s conclusion that 
“decentralization both improves and worsens…outcomes in different countries at 
different times, leaving us unable to draw broader outcomes” is hardly surprising 
(Faguet 2014, 10).  
Bardhan goes a step further. He argues that decentralization fares poorly in 
developing countries because “structures of local accountability are not in place … and 
local governments are often at the mercy of local power elites who may frustrate the 
goal of achieving public delivery to the general populace of social services, 
infrastructural facilities and the conditions conducive to local business development” 
(Badhan 2002, 202). Like Faguet, he concludes that unless “governments are more 
responsive to the felt needs of the majority” (Bardhan 2002, 187), which they are mostly 
not in autocracies or in many transition political systems, devolution will be undermined 
in practice. 
Weingast agrees, maintaining that in developing countries, where institutions are 
weak, predatory leaders who face “relatively few constraints” can alter them “to suit their 
purposes.” This tends to undermine decentralization as those in power can “reverse or 
compromise any or all of its benefits.” In contrast, democracy, with all its flaws, 
setbacks, and tensions, has certain features that are more likely to preserve it, as noted 
above. Preservation becomes “self-enforcing when political officials at all levels of the 
hierarchy have incentives to honor the rules, including one and other’s power and 
authority” (Weingast 2014, 15). In contrast, non-democracies often are unable to make 
credible commitments to durable institutions, policies or citizen benefits as their leaders 
can “engineer major changes in institutions almost at will” and often do so (Weingast 
2014,18). 
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Treisman goes further arguing that there is nothing inherently preferable about 
decentralization. He insists that many of the positive assumptions underpinning the 
devolution paradigm discussed earlier are not necessarily true in practice nor 
intrinsically absent from more centralized systems (Treisman 2007). Yet, he too finds 
that in developing as opposed to developed systems, the greater the number of tiers of 
government the greater the corruption, with each additional tier of government 
increasing informal payments by 2.6 percent. Increasing the number of local 
government personnel also correlates with corruption in developing countries. Fan, Lin, 
and Treisman also observe that elections in non-democracies mostly have no mitigating 
effect on devolved corruption as elites can buy off or intimidate citizens (Fan et. al. 
2009). Hence, devolution may actually worsen the defects it was supposed to improve 
by increasing corruption and state capture and reducing accountability (Bardhan, 2002). 
These disincentives dovetail with the reality that local governments often are weak 
administratively and technically and either are unable to monitor devolved authorities or 
too frightened to do so. 
Additionally, increasing the number of units of local government may increase 
their ethnic homogeneity. This tends to favor co-ethnics over non-co-ethnics whether in 
the distribution of public goods or even citizenship rights as Manby notes concerning the 
introduction of federalism in Nigeria and Ethiopia (Manby 2009, 109–14).  
Given the above, the poor and minorities in developing systems sometimes find 
they are worse off in devolved authorities and ironically “look to central government for 
relief” (Bardhan 2002, 188) with Bardhan suggesting that “decentralization may need 
some protection from its own enthusiasts” (Bardhan 2002, 187). 
Devolution in Kenya. 
Kenya’s experience with devolution illustrates the disjuncture between the theories 
underpinning the devolution paradigm and the reality on the ground. It documents in 
detail the mechanisms used to undermine the assumptions discussed earlier thereby 
going beyond the generalizations noted above. 
Background 
After decades of unmet political pressures for greater democracy and accountability, 
Kenya’s new 2010 constitution introduced new devolved authorities. The constitution’s 
passage responded to longstanding historical demands by marginalized groups and 
areas for increased local power and resources, including control over land (Ghai 2008; 
Kanyinga 2016; Wolf 2010). It also aimed to diffuse regional tensions and to reduce 
Kenya’s recurrent electoral violence stemming from high stakes ethnic contests for the 
presidency (Mueller 2008; Mueller forthcoming). It did so by creating alternative sources 
of local political power to check centralization, executive power, and the perception of 
elections as zero–sum winner take all events (Bosire 2014).  
After independence in 1963 and the passage of the Local Government Act in 
1965, local authorities in Kenya, lost power, resources, and administrative functions to 
the national government as it became increasingly centralized, repressive, and its 
provincial administration took charge of most local development and security functions. 
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Modest attempts to empower local authorities including the 1961 Special Rural 
Development Program and the 1983 District Focus on Rural Development withered over 
time, with the District Commissioner, appointed by the central government, continuing to 
head District Development Committees (Oloo 2014; Tordoff 1999, 561–62). 
The passage of the 2010 constitution, preceded by a referendum, largely 
upended this entrenched system, notwithstanding tensions between the old and the 
new. Some wondered if old incentives would undermine new formal legal changes and 
if government would support the new architecture. 
Modeled on state governments in the United States, the constitution created 
forty-seven counties, with new administrative, fiscal and political powers, in place of 
districts, raising Northian questions about its transferability to another context. The 
constitution created new elected positions for Governors (47), Deputy Governors (47), 
Senators (67), and County Councilors (2,222), including women’s representatives and 
other marginalized groups (Government of Kenya 2016, 106–22). It guaranteed funding 
(at least 15 percent of the national revenue and closer to 30 percent in practice) to 
devolved authorities based on a formula to ensure equity while also creating a new and 
enlarged local administrative apparatus to carry out new sectoral functions, sometimes 
shared with the central government, at the country level (World Bank 2014). It also 
created an equalization fund of 0.5 percent of the national budget to top up funds in 
historically marginalized areas. The result was a transfer to counties of $3 billion a year 
and a larger wage bill (World Bank 2016).  
Kenya has had two elections to fill the new positions, one in 2013 and another in 
2017, with implementation beginning only after the 2013 election.  
General Findings 
In terms of the optimistic predictions behind the devolution paradigm discussed above, 
Kenya has had a mixed experience (Government of Kenya 2016). The main effect of 
implementing the new formal legal changes has been more resources, jobs and public 
goods at the country level. Citizens have welcomed these changes. Yet, they come at a 
cost. Many patterns of national political behavior from the past persist locally. 
Anticipated changes in participation and accountability have not occurred, leaving 
citizens feeling frustrated and powerless. While there have been increases in the 
distribution of public sector goods at the local level, particularly in the social sectors, we 
know little about who is getting what, when and how (Lasswell 1950). Massive 
corruption within country governments has cut into the availability of public sector goods 
and increases non-productive expenditures, possibly threatening the future viability and 
integrity of local government itself (Government of Kenya 2013–2018). The inability, and 
in some cases unwillingness, of counties to generate anticipated revenue, makes them 
more vulnerable to central government control. Intergovernmental relations remain 
adversarial and frosty. Counties say the national government is “not fully supporting 
devolution” while “the national government views counties as wasteful and ungrateful” 
(Government of Kenya 2016, 35). There also are power struggles within and between 
different layers of government (Oruko 2018). Devolution has not decreased the salience 
of presidential power or the importance of high stakes ethnic politics to win it (Mueller 
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forthcoming). Nor has it necessarily affected the potential for electoral violence. Little 
data exists to ascertain if devolution has reduced perceptions of marginalization in 
certain areas with reports still suggesting some discrimination against ethnic minorities. 
Faguet’s notes evaluations of devolution elsewhere tend to focus on output data 
by sector rather than assessing its effect on changes in the quality of governance 
(Faguet 2014). Bardhan discusses the difficulties of generalizing about devolution’s 
effect when most studies incorrectly deduce causality from correlations, do not control 
for other factors, and do not examine the causal processes at work (Faguet 2014; 
Bardhan 2002). These same methodological issues, incomplete data, and other factors 
limit our understanding of devolution in Kenya and its overall effects, in part because it 
is only five years old (Mohamed 2018; D’Arcy 2018; Kwach no date); Mariru 2018). 
Despite these difficulties, a 2018 Ipsos survey indicates widespread and growing 
enthusiasm for devolution since 2014, irrespective of party and region (Ipsos 2018a). 
Support has climbed from 69 percent in late 2014 to 84 percent in March of 2018, with 
those against it falling from 28 percent to 13 percent for the same period, with 84 
percent of Jubilee’s and 86 percent of the National Super Alliance’s (NASA’s), Kenya’s 
two main political parties’ followers behind it. Disaggregated by region, the approval 
ratings are also consistently in the mid-80s for all areas, with the exception of the Coast 
(90 percent) and the North East (75 percent). These positive views of devolution persist 
notwithstanding reports from Kenya’s Auditor General documenting massive corruption 
within Kenya’s devolved authorities since 2013 (Government of Kenya, 2013–2018). 
A 2017 USAID study (USAID, 2017) found that country governments had 
implemented the required framework to carry out their devolved functions, but 
sometimes lacked adequate resources to do so. Counties performed well when 
obtaining funding required them to adhere to certain laws and procedures and 
significantly less well in other areas. Hence, counties had a compliance rate of 92 
percent for the county budget process, 91 percent for financial expenditure and 
procurement, and 90 percent for the functionality of the Country Assembly. It is unclear 
how these positive numbers dovetail with the findings on corruption. However, in other 
areas, compliance rates were poorer. There was only 60 percent compliance on human 
resources and administrative structures, 63 percent on public participation, and 60 
percent on resource mobilization with just half of the counties meeting their targets due 
to elected officials discouraging taxation for political reasons. Other findings include 58 
percent on planning, 57 percent on access to information which has reduced the 
potential for effective participation, 55 percent on implementing sectoral plans, 53 
percent on service delivery, 51 percent on monitoring and evaluation and reporting, 50 
percent on inter-country relations, and only 41 percent on policies, laws, administrative 
procedures and implementation. While counties scored 65 percent on adhering to 
counter-marginalization rules, the report’s findings raise concerns about larger ethnic 
groups dominating the composition of country civil services. 
The study also observed there were few incentives to devolve power to lower 
level units and a propensity to centralize at the county level to the disadvantage of the 
sub-counties and wards. It indicated that while mechanisms for public participation 
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existed they did not have the funding to work, whether by design or neglect, and noted 
tensions between Governors and County Assemblies that impeded progress.  
State Capture 
One question arising from the discussion of the assumptions behind the devolution 
paradigm is the extent to which legally devolved powers are independent of the national 
government or instead are vulnerable to state capture and recentralization by the 
central government. Findings here indicate that national cleavages reproduced locally, 
central government policies, and inadequate revenue all can impinge on county 
autonomy and independence. This in turn suggests that the success or failure of 
devolution depends on more than formal legal institutional changes. 
In a referendum on the constitution in 2010, over two thirds of voters supported 
devolution with later opinion polls climbing to over 80 percent (Cheeseman et al. 2016). 
Yet, fears persisted, and continue to persist about key figures in central government, 
who long have opposed devolution, attempting to recentralize authority (Kegoro 2019a). 
Government’s decision to retain Provincial and District Commissioners, historically the 
administrative arm of executive authority, under new names further fueled these fears 
and still does so. 
The examples below also suggest the state may either embrace devolution or 
undermine it opportunistically depending on what is at stake. Blaming local authorities is 
useful when there are problems government does not want to assume, while subverting 
them may be equally beneficial when something as important as land titling or winning 
elections is at stake. 
According to some scholars, devolved authorities in Kenya are less susceptible 
to state capture than one might imagine. County Governors, they argue, have proved 
“willing and capable” of protecting their positions as local pressures make it “politically 
dangerous for them to be coopted by the center” and thus “has narrowed their options 
when negotiating with the national government” (Cheeseman et al. 2016, 2, 5). They 
note that while many expected President Kenyatta’s pro–government Jubilee party 
governors would be more vulnerable to central government pressures, even they 
supported increasing revenue to the counties. 
However, evidence also exists of attempts by Jubilee at the national level 
successfully putting pressure on local Councilors and MPs to mobilize votes for 
Kenyatta during the 2017 presidential election rerun (Waddilove 2019). These elected 
officials felt working for Jubilee was in their interest and something they could not refuse 
because of their own dependence on the center for patronage and support (Waddilove, 
2019). This fell far short of state capture and a recentralization of power. However, the 
dynamics of the 2017 presidential election rerun demonstrated local Jubilee leaders’ 
dependence on the center, including the way national pressures could shape county 
level politicians’ behavior and reduce their autonomy locally. 
Other findings are also less sanguine about the potential for counties to resist 
state capture and recentralization. D’Arcy and Cornell note that a recentralization of 
authority has happened elsewhere, including in Uganda and Burundi, and cannot 
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automatically be discounted (Darcy and Cornell 2016, 271–72). One tool for central 
government is to increase the regulation of devolved authorities. Currently, Senators 
who resent the greater power of Governors have used their control of Country 
Development Committees to frustrate Governors with some County Councilors having 
tried to impeach both Governors and Senators (Steeves 2015). This could make both 
groups, but Senators in particular, more susceptible to central government’s pressures 
to gain further influence and power for themselves. 
The greatest potential for recentralization of power stems from the reluctance 
and/or inability of devolved authorities to raise sufficient revenue (Steeves 2015; Wanjiri 
2014; Government of Kenya 2016, 32). This makes local authorities more dependent on 
the center and more vulnerable to it. A World Bank study cites attempts to introduce 
controversial new charges in parking fees, business permits, health inspections, and 
billboard charges, in one case by 350 percent in Mombasa (World Bank 2014), which 
then resulted in protests, both at the Coast and elsewhere (Government of Kenya 2016, 
32). Wanjiri (Wanjiri 2014) also documents the same syndrome in her study of revenue 
mobilization in Laikipia and Taita Taveta. This included opposition to taxation, non-
compliance, protests, ill equipped staff, difficulties imposing taxes in areas such as land 
rates due to out of date and incorrect valuations and in imposing fees for services when 
counties charged but failed to deliver them. Additionally, she found certain counties did 
not have the potential or ability to meet their targets, something also noted in a 2016 
government study (Government of Kenya 2016, 31–32).  
In his discussion of Mombasa, Chome (Chome 2015, 301) finds county officials 
subject to conflicting pressures: pressures from the center to meet technocratic 
expectations, including raising revenue for development, and pressures from below for 
patronage and favoritism, which, if they failed to honor, could lead to their losing power 
in the next election. He defines the problem as “elite vulnerability” to clientelism rather 
than elite capture from the center, but also indicates that the counties’ “strong 
dependence on revenue from national government” has the potential to undercut their 
independence. 
A 2016 Government of Kenya audit of devolution found “counties facing serious 
challenges on … revenue collection, with some counties collecting less than what the 
defunct local authorities, municipal and/or country councils used to collect when 
combined.” As of 2014, business permits (37 percent), user fees (32 percent) and 
property rates (31 percent) were the main sources of county revenue, with some 
counties forced to borrow from local banks to pay salaries because of shortfalls and an 
inability to meet their revenue collection targets (Government of Kenya 2016, 31, 29).  
In the case of reforms in land administration following the 2010 constitution, 
Boone demonstrates how the Ministry of Lands in conjunction with various national and 
local “veto players” was able to stymie the working of the newly created National Land 
Commission and its Country Land Management Boards (CLMB) both by changing laws 
and through informal interventions. The results led to what Boone calls an effective 
“claw-back” of executive power (Boone 2019), something also noted by others (Kegoro 
2019b; D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2019). These findings lend empirical support to points 
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made earlier in this paper about why devolution and other institutional reforms often are 
undermined in practice by old incentives.  
Apart from state capture by national elites, the potential also exists for local elites 
and business interests to capture county level governments. This appears to have 
happened in the case of Nakuru County. There, local government officials ignored rules 
and safety regulations that led to the collapse of the Solai Dam in 2018 to benefit the 
dam’s owners and their businesses (KHRC 2018). In a related government survey on 
perceptions of corruption, 32 percent of the responders also identified the award of 
tenders as an area where it was rife, suggesting the potential for state capture.  
In the area of health, country level hospitals have lost power, autonomy, 
decision-making, and access to funds under devolution. Here, capture comes not from 
the national, but country level government. Hence, doctors and staff at country level 
hospitals and personal feel short changed by devolution and think they were better off 
under the old centralized system (Barasa et al. 2017). This conforms to some findings 
elsewhere noted earlier where devolved power seems worse than that at the center and 
highlights the point made by the USAID study discussed above about the 
recentralization of power at the country level.  
Decentralized Despotism, Participation and Accountability 
One question arising from the assumptions behind the devolution paradigm and the 
critiques of them is whether behavioral changes would accompany the formal legal 
changes of devolution. Would elected representatives and administrators behave 
differently and better than national officials or the same? Would county governments be 
more accountable to citizens and would citizens’ local knowledge and information assist 
them in checking the power of their elected officials and bureaucrats? If so, would 
counties then be more honest and less corrupt than central government and if not why 
not? 
D’Arcy and Cornell (D’Arcy and Cornell 2016) find that while the form of 
government has changed with devolution, the substance has not. According to them, 
the winner take all ethos is still intact. The only difference is a change from the “It’s Our 
Turn to Eat’” mentality to “It’s Everyone’s Turn to Eat.” They argue the main attraction of 
devolution and the enormous enthusiasm for it stems from the increase in positions and 
resources at the local level. In short, it is still the same game with new local actors. 
Hence, the forces prevailing at the county level and the behavior arising from them do 
not differ from those at the center: the agglomeration of elite power, corruption, neo-
patrimonialism, and favoritism of co-ethnic majorities.  
The signals some locally elected officials initially sent suggested they were keen 
to display the trappings of power. Governors attached Kenyan flags to their cars, 
insisted on being called His Excellency, engaged in “rent seeking and ethnic patronage 
politics” (D’Arcy and Cornell 2016, 249), and spent more on sitting allowances than 
allowed and more on foreign travel than their national counterparts (D’Arcy and Cornell 
2016, 264, 266). Devolved officials did not act as if they were closer to or more 
interested in grassroots concerns. Instead, complaints surfaced especially about the 
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Members of Country Assemblies (MCAs): about their profligate personal spending, the 
reality that their monthly salaries were higher than most government departments and 
that “they outnumbered the total number of doctors in the country, and … the total 
number of teachers in Turkana County” (Ayaga 2016). Accused of “looting and 
incompetence” (Ngugi 2017), others have called for their impeachment or the 
elimination of MCAs altogether (Mwangi 2018). 
Beyond what D’Arcy and Cornell have documented, our knowledge is 
incomplete. Corruption is rampant, according to the Auditor General’s reports and local 
newspaper articles. Local officials are engaged in profligate personal spending which 
saps what is available for legitimate projects. Some county administrations have given 
more jobs to members of the dominant ethnic groups than to marginalized minorities, 
but we do not know the full extent of this (Amadala and Mbula 2019).  
There are some checks and balances. Many county officials lost their seats in the 
2016 elections, but we do not know if their replacements differ from those who lost. 
Beyond this, citizens at the county and sub-county level lack sufficient information, 
funds, and avenues for increased participation and accountability (USAID 2017; World 
Bank 2014). 
Concerning participation, a 2016 Afro-Barometer Survey on devolved 
governance found that 81 percent of respondents report that “it is very difficult to 
participate in county government” while 77 percent say they “never had any contact with 
country assembly members” (Mitullah 2016). The results of a survey of all counties by 
the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics dovetail with these results. Over 40 percent of 
respondents said, they had no influence over either the county or national government, 
with more than 24 percent replying only a little. This translates into almost 70 percent 
admitting they had either no or hardly any influence over government at either level. 
Another set of findings on the extent to which the national and county governments 
reflected their needs found similar results; over 34 percent replied “never” or “hardly 
ever,” with another 36 percent saying only in “small areas,” translating to more than a 70 
percent level of dissatisfaction. Furthermore, 92 percent of citizens surveyed had not 
participated in any country meeting on the budget, on laws, or on policies (Government 
of Kenya 2016, 20–21, 118). 
A 2015 press release of another survey by Afro-Barometer found that individuals 
do not report corruption because of “fears of consequences and government inaction” 
(Afro-Barometer 2015). A 2017 report of a survey by Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission (EACC) confirms the Afro-Barometer findings. The EACC found 27 percent 
of respondents did not report instances of corruption because they knew no one would 
take action, while another 26 percent said they feared intimidation. Asked why most 
corruption went unreported, 77.6 percent of respondents cited a fear of reprisals (EACC 
2018, 26, 28). This suggests that a lack of information may not be the main explanation 
for low participation. 
Hence, the notion of devolved systems automatically inducing better government, 
including greater citizen involvement and accountability, as the positive assumptions 
behind the devolution paradigm assume, seems not to be occurring. These findings 
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dovetail with the results of general research elsewhere and the critiques of the 
assumptions of the devolution paradigm, discussed earlier. 
Increased Corruption and the Distribution of Public Goods 
Another question arising from the general literature is whether more levels of 
government would increase corruption and how this would affect the positive 
assumptions about devolution, including the anticipated changes in behavior of county 
level politicians and administrators leading to improved outcomes including less 
corruption and more public sector goods. 
Fan, Lin, and Treisman’s (Fan et al. 2009) finding of corruption increasing along 
with more tiers of government holds for Kenya. County-by-County audits from the 
Auditor General’s office in Kenya (Government of Kenya 2013–18) document extensive 
corruption since 2013. Kenya’s Ethnics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) also 
lists Kenya’s most corrupt counties (Ethics and Anti-Government Commission 2018). 
The Auditor General’s reports reveal numerous illegal expenditures particularly 
by elected members of Country Assemblies. They include the following: flagrant 
discrepancies between budgets and expenditures, expenditures unsupported by any 
documentation, unnecessary and unauthorized foreign travel and per diem 
expenditures, fake claims for sitting allowances, inflated car and mortgage loans, 
insurance and car maintenance costs. The reports also find questionable tenders to 
businesses, the violation of existing procurement regulations, failures to bank revenue 
collected, and the existence of multiple bank accounts, among others (Government of 
Kenya 2013–2018). One result is not just a general increase in government wages and 
expenditures under devolution, but also a large rise in unsupported expenditures from 2 
percent, or Ksh. 34 billion, in 2012/13 to 5 percent, or 67 billion in 2013/14 (Government 
of Kenya 2016, xx, 93). Furthermore, there is no definitive evidence that “more money is 
going to the grassroots under devolution than before” (Government of Kenya 2016, 94–
95). 
The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC 2015, 2018) also documents 
increasing corruption in devolved counties. A 2017 study found the highest levels of 
bribery in country level finance and planning, health, and transport departments (EACC, 
2018: 54). The World Bank voiced a related early concern: that only 21 percent of 
country budgets went to development, while salaries and administration took up 46 
percent and 30 percent respectively (Steeves 2015, 465). One reason for this 
misallocation could be large-scale documented corruption at the country level. 
The overall effect of both corruption and the skewed allocation of country 
resources by elected county officials and administrators is the same: a reduction in what 
is available for public goods as opposed to personal consumption, kickbacks, and 
clientelism. 
The high level of documented corruption in Kenya’s counties and the misuse use 
of public funds by locally elected officials raises the question of why there still is such 
widespread support for devolution. Citizens are not ignorant. In the Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics survey, 80 percent of respondents thought corruption “was rife in 
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their county government” and even identified the worst areas as tender awards (32 
percent), employment (40 percent), scholarships and bursary awards (10 percent), 
health sector (4 percent), and other (5 percent) (Government of Kenya 2016, 29). More 
recently, the results of a 2018 Ipsos survey revealed that 81 percent of respondents 
were aware of corruption in Kenya, with 70 percent saying no one would be convicted 
and 40 percent attributing this to “political protection” (Ipsos 2018b).  Furthermore, the 
media has not been silent on these matters. Hence, citizens are not ill informed even if 
they do not have all the details, are afraid to act on what they know, or do not act 
because they themselves benefit from corruption in some way or hope to do so.  
It seems two factors are at work. First, the delivery of public sector goods has 
increased under devolution, particularly in health, education, and water. Second, 
citizens’ enthusiasm for devolution reflects that reality, simultaneously acknowledging 
corruption while discounting it. 
The transfer of funds to the counties has increased from Ksh 197.7 billion in 
2013/14 to Ksh 272 billion in 2016, with an increase in public expenditures and wages 
and in funds for development spending. A government audit notes that devolution is 
delivering results consistent with “people’s expectations of increased access to 
services” particularly in health, education, agriculture and water (Government of Kenya 
2016, 201, xvi, xix). Yet, because budget reporting across sectors is not the same for all 
counties, it is not possible to get comparable “data to assess the impact of devolution” 
or even to know where exactly county budgets have gone by sector. Is it mostly salaries 
and wages, buildings or is it going to improved or previously non-existent services and 
to whom (Government of Kenya 2016, 43, 46)? 
Asked why they supported devolution in spite of widespread local corruption, 
citizens replied as follows: “at least we have a road now,” “some hospitals got maternal 
care leading to fewer deaths of mothers and babies,” and “I was able to connect water 
and electricity in the rural areas easily and quickly unlike the past” (Mueller 2018). 
 If these comments are indicative, citizens may find that what they are 
experiencing under devolution compares favorably to public service delivery in the past 
and is no more corrupt than what occurs nationally (Maina, 2019). Transparency 
International’s latest Corruption Perception Index ranked Kenya 143 out of 180 
countries and one of the 50 most corrupt countries in the World (Transparency 
International, 2018). Its perception of corruption index of 28 out of 100 for Kenya also 
placed it below Africa’s low average of 34. Yet, under devolution, many citizens are 
receiving, or perceive they are receiving, tangible benefits compared to the past 
including more local resources, jobs, power, and a greater ease of doing business 
locally. Another possible interpretation is that the initial “big bang” effect of devolution 
may have sheltered citizens from the full impact of local corruption.  
 Elsewhere, research from Indonesia and Europe suggests that citizens seem to 
derive satisfaction from exerting greater direct control over the process of local 
government and affairs even when this has no or little substantive effect on their 
welfare. The effect seems greatest when the shift in control is away from poorly 
performing or corrupt governments: from local governments in Indonesia to popular 
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referenda and from national governments in Europe to local authorities (Olken 2010; 
Rodriguez-Pose and Tselios 2019). Beyond this, in Kenya we still know little about what 
differentiates more successful counties such as Makueni County from those that have 
not delivered or if corrupt local officials losing elections eventually will act as a general 
corrective. Makueni has built a fruit processing factory (Mutavi 2018; Aglionby 2018), 
thereby increasing employment and revenue, and has introduced an innovative new 
system guaranteeing free health care for all (Gathera 2018). Elsewhere, Kakamega and 
Kwale have success stories of their own in dairy farming and mining (Waikenda 2018). 
Nevertheless, the most recent Auditor Generals’ reports suggest corruption is still 
significant even in these counties. 
For now, Treisman’s finding holds along with D’Arcy and Cornell’s observation 
that devolution has produced a great deal more of the same from the past, in line with 
what the critiques of the positive assumptions underlying the development paradigm 
argue. Yet without more studies by county and sector, it is impossible to generalize fully 
about what is occurring or its extent.  
Marginalization of Ethnic Minorities 
Another question arising from the assumptions underpinning the devolution paradigm is 
whether marginalized areas would feel less marginalized under devolution and if ethnic 
and other minorities within these and other areas would be treated better or would fare 
worse than they had in the past. 
Marginalized populations often support devolution (Grossman and Lewis 2014) 
whereas ethnic majorities in devolved authorities frequently discriminate against ethnic 
minorities. There is a vast literature on co-ethnic favoritism in Kenya by politicians 
including in the distribution of public and private goods that follow from having a co-
ethnic as president and in other political positions of power (Mueller forthcoming). 
There is evidence of ethnic marginalization occurring within devolved counties in 
Kenya since devolution. Yet, to date the information available is limited (Government of 
Kenya 2016, 167–69; Amadala and Mbula 2019). Hence, it is impossible to document 
its extent, its effect on how government operates, or whether and how it has infused 
various devolved sectors. What we do know to date is quite general. 
D’Arcy and Cornell argue that the main reason devolution is so popular is “that a 
new cadre of the elite and every ethnic group saw it as their turn to ‘eat’ state resources 
that traditionally were available only to those holding power at the center” (D’Arcy and 
Cornell 2016, 248). 
 However, this winner take all mentality also has the potential to benefit majority 
ethnic groups and to exclude “trapped minorities” in devolved counties. In the first group 
of elected Governors, all but four came from the majority ethnic community. In 29 of the 
County Executive Committees (CECs), which are appointed by governors, the majority 
ethnic group held most of the seats, while 16 were mono-ethnic, with both violating the 
legal requirements of “ethnic balance” (D’Arcy and Cornell 2016, 263–66). Otherwise, in 
some places “trapped minorities” (D’Arcy and Cornell 2016) feel vulnerable and 
threatened. In others, devolution has strengthened the power of new sub-groups 
18     Susanne Mueller 
 
(Nyabira and Ayele 2016), leading to new dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. This 
majority minority dynamic also may have increased the power of County Councilors 
from majority ethnic groups at the local level given their greater access to public funds 
and their ability to engage in corruption. Yet, to date one has not heard of anything 
comparable to the severe forms of ethnic discrimination experienced by minorities in 
federal entities in Ethiopia and Nigeria where they have difficulty establishing citizenship 
where they live if they were not born there which also translates into job and other types 
of discrimination (Manby 2009,109–14). Burbidge agrees. He also notes that the 
greatest abuse of ethnic power is not in areas that are mostly mono-ethnic, but rather, 
and to some extent counter-intuitively in areas where there are many smaller ethnic 
groups and the winning one uses its power to reward co-ethnics and discriminate 
against the rest (Burbidge 2018). 
Otherwise, in conflict areas such as Marsabit, where issues related to land, 
violence and ethnicity are intertwined Scott-Villiers found ethnic groups feared losing to 
non-co-ethnics in devolved authorities not because they expected to materially gain if 
their co-ethnic won but “to lose less if their ethnic group gained power” (Scott-Villiers 
2017). Hence, at the country level, fears of ethnic loss over the presidency translated 
into a fear of not having a co-ethnic Governor. In short, ethnic behavior at the bottom 
seemed to be a microcosm of national level politics at the top.  
Bosire (Bosire 2014) concurs, maintaining the winner take all mentality discussed 
by Scott-Villiers is still alive. He insists further that the existence of counties has not 
dissipated the power and importance of capturing the presidency, as some suggested 
would happen. With the national government still maintaining the bulk of political power, 
Bosire argues the larger ethnic groups still focus on “clinching the presidency” with 
smaller groups drawn into the conflict” (Bosire 2014, 20). Thus, the positive assumption 
in the literature about devolved authorities reducing the importance of ethnic 
competition for the presidency is at least questionable, a perception reinforced by 
Kenya’s 2017 election. This included President Kenyatta giving out 2 percent more land 
titles to his Kikuyu co-ethnics when they were the largest minority in a county than to 
non-co-ethnics in the same situation (D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2019, 8, 10, 12). 
Conclusion 
The discussion above has analyzed the positive assumptions behind the devolution 
paradigm and the main critiques of them. It reviewed devolution’s performance on the 
ground in different parts of the world and Kenya’s experience to date. Both the analytic 
and empirical evidence raise questions about the optimistic assumptions underpinning 
the hopes embodied in the devolution paradigm. Instead, the findings generally and 
from Kenya tend to support the critiques of these same assumptions, revealing a 
sizable disjuncture between the enthusiasm for devolution and the evidence for it. They 
also raise broad questions about institutional change and the conditions that propel or 
derail it, including the belief that changing the architecture of government improves its 
performance.  
The premise of decentralization is that the factors that undermine national 
government decision-making are less pernicious in local settings. Broad cross-country 
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comparisons and the experience of Kenya in particular suggest that this is not the case. 
Decentralization is not a panacea for the dysfunctions of centralized states and 
centralization is not necessarily the problem. New structures tend to take on the 
characteristics of old systems rather than transforming them, as they have in Kenya and 
in other parts of the world. Yet, just as democracy has not emerged full bloom neither 
has devolution (Ziblatt 2004; Fukuyama 2014), suggesting that both involve long 
struggles between the old and the new with uncertain outcomes and that institutional 
change may be a dependent rather than an independent variable. Hence, the political 
economy of the state is more likely to determine the outcome of devolution rather than 
devolution transforming governance. This raises broader questions about the use of 
formal technical and administrative fixes by practitioners to remedy what are inherently 
political problems. 
The Kenya government’s 2016 own audit of devolution partly concurs with this 
view and North’s argument concerning the limits of formal legal changes and the 
importance of other factors. It notes that “the uncertainty, conflicts and tensions 
characterizing the implementation [of the constitution and devolution] point to the fact 
that the transition is not only about institutions but also [the] transformation of society by 
adapting to a new culture and breaking away from the past.” During its consultations, 
citizens themselves insisted, “Kenyans need to change their behavior and adopt the 
national values enshrined in the constitution … to realize its benefits,” with tensions 
between the “status quo” and “genuine transition” derailing reform” (Government of 
Kenya 2016, 5–6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Susanne D. Mueller is a Visiting Researcher at Boston University’s African Studies 
Center. Her email is susannedmueller@gmail.com 
 
 
 
  
20     Susanne Mueller 
 
Bibliography 
Afro-Barometer. 2015. “UoN Releases Findings on Devolution and Corruption in 
Kenya.” Accessed December 12, 2018. http://afrobarometer.org/blogs/devolution-
and-corruption-kenya, 
Aglionby, John. 2018. “Inside Kenya’s Ambitious Devolution Project.” Financial Times, 
June 27, 2018. Accessed December 18, 2018. https://www.ft.com/ 
Agrawal, Arun, and Jesse Ribot. 1999. “Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework 
with South Asian and West African Cases.” Journal of Developing Areas 33, 4: 473–
502. 
Amadala,, Benson and Ruth Mbula. 2019. “County Jobs Mainly Given to People from 
Dominant Communities, Audit Says.” Daily Nation, April 8, 2019. 
https://www.nation.co.ke/ 
Ardanaz, Martin, Marcelo Leiras, and Mariano Tommasi. 2014. “The Politics of 
Federalism in Argentina and its Implications for Governance and Accountability.” 
World Development 53: 26–45. 
Ayaga, Winifred. 2016. “‘MCAs’ Changing Fortunes’”: How Once Tiny Post Has Become 
Golden Thanks to Devolution.” The Standard, August 15, 2016. 
Barasa, Edwin, Anthony Manyara, Sassy Molyneux, and Benjamin Sofa. 2017. 
“Recentralization within Decentralization: Country Hospital Autonomy under 
Devolution in Kenya.” Plos One 12, 8: 1–15. 
Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. “Decentralization of Governance and Development.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16, 4: 185–205. 
Bardhan, Pranab, and Dilip Mookherjee, eds. 2006. Decentralization and Local 
Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Boone, Catherine. 2003. “Decentralization in West Africa.” Comparative Political Studies 
36, 4: 355–80. 
Boone, Catherine, Alex Dyzenhaus, Ambreena Manji, Catherine Gateri, Seth Ouma, 
James Kabugu Owino, Achiba Gargule, and Jacqueline Klopp. 2019. “Land Law 
Reform in Kenya: Devolution, Veto Players and the Limits of an Institutional Fix.” 
African Affairs 118, 471: 215–47.  
Bosire, Conrad M. 2014. “Kenya’s Ethno-Politics and the Implementation of Devolution 
Under the Constitution of Kenya 2010.” In Conference Proceedings No. 2, Swedish 
International Centre for Local Development, Nairobi Safari Club, 2–6 June 2014, 
13–22. 
The Devolution Paradigm     21 
 
Burbidge, Dominic. 2018. “Democracy Versus Diversity: Ethnic Representation in a 
Devolved Kenya.” Unpublished paper.  
Cheeseman, Nic, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis. 2016. “Decentralization in Kenya: 
The Governance of Governors.” Journal of Modern African Studies 54, 1: 1–35.  
Chome, Ngala. 2015. “Devolution Is Only for Development? Decentralization and Elite 
Vulnerability on the Kenya Coast.” Critical African Studies 7, 3: 299–316. 
Commonwealth Local Government Forum. “The Local Government System in Kenya: 
Country Profile 2017–18.” Commonwealth Local Government Forum East Africa. 
Accessed December 21, 2018. 
http://www.clgf.org.uk/default/assets/File/Country_profiles/Kenya.pd. 
Corbacho, Ana, Daniel W. Gingerich, Virginia Oliveros, and Mauricio Ruiz-Vega. 
“Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in 
Costa Rica.” 2016. American Journal of Political Science 60,4 :1077-92. 
D’Arcy, Michelle. 2018. “Kenya Illustrates both the Promise as well as the Pitfalls of 
Devolution.” The Conversation, May 23, 2018. Accessed December 18, 2018. 
https://theconversation.com/kenya-illustrates-both-the-promise-as-well-as-the-
pitfalls-of-devolution-96729.  
D’Arcy, Michelle, and Agnes Cornell. 2016. “Devolution and Corruption in Kenya: 
Everyone’s Turn to Eat?” African Affairs 115, 459: 246–73. 
D’Arcy, Michelle, and Marina Nistotskaya. 2019. “Intensified Local Grievances, Enduring 
National Control: The Politics of Land in the 2017 Kenyan Elections.” Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 13, 2: 294–312.  
Ethnics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC). 2015. Corruption and Ethnics in 
Devolved Services: Counties Public Officers’ Experiences. Nairobi: EACC. 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC). 2018. National Ethnics and Corruption 
Survey, 2017. EASS Research Report No. 6. Nairobi, Kenya: EACC. 
Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2014. “Decentralization and Governance.” World Development 53: 
2–12. 
Fan, C. Simon, Chen Lin, and Daniel Treisman. 2009. “Political Decentralization and 
Corruption: Evidence from around the World.” Journal of Public Economics 9, 1–2: 
13–34. 
Friedrich, Carl. 1968. Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice 
in Europe and America. 4th ed. Waltham, MA: Blaisdell. 
22     Susanne Mueller 
 
Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. ”America in Decay: The Sources of Political Dysfunction.” 
Foreign Affairs, 93: 5–12. 
Gathara, Patrick. 2018. “(D)evolved Health Care: Makueni’s Trailblazing Experiment in 
Providing Universal Health Coverage.” The Elephant, January 11, 2018. Accessed 
December 18, 2018. https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/01/11/devolved-
healthcare-makuenis-trailblazing-experiment-in-providing-universal-health-
coverage/.  
Ghai, Yash. 2008. “Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan State.” Journal of Eastern 
African Studies 2, 2: 211-26. 
Government of Kenya, Office of the Auditor General. 2013–18. Country Government 
Reports, Nairobi, Kenya. Accessed December 12, 2018. https://www.oagkenya. 
go.ke/index.php/reports/cat_view/2-reports/11-county-governments.  
Government of Kenya. Office of the Auditor General. 2016. Report of the Working 
Group on the Socio-Economic Audit of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Nairobi, 
Kenya, September. Accessed January 24, 2019. https://www.oagkenya.go.ke/index. 
php/reports/cat_view/2-reports/72-special-audit-reports. 
Grindle, Merilee. 2007. Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the 
Promise of Good Governance. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Grossman, Guy, and Janet I. Lewis. 2014. “Administrative Unit Proliferation.” American 
Political Science Review 108, 1: 196–217. 
Hassan, Mai, and Ryan Sheely. 2017. “Executive-Legislative Relations, Party 
Defections, and Lower Level Administrative Unit Proliferation: Evidence from 
Kenya.” Comparative Political Studies 50, 12: 1595 –1631. 
 
Ipsos Public Affairs. 2018, a. Spec Barometer, First Media Release, 1st QTR 2018, 6 
April 2018 (https://www.ipsos.com/en-ke/q1-national-spec-survey-2018). 
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-
08/ipsoske_spec_1st_release_presentation_pa_v1.pdf.  
Ipsos Public Affairs. 2018, b. Spec Barometer, First Media Release, 2nd QTR 2018. 22 
August 2018. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2018-
08/ipsoske_spec_poll_press_release_presentation_august_2018.pdf or this: 
https://hapakenya.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/IpsosKE_SPEC-Poll_-Press-
Release_Presentation_August-2018.pdf 
Kanyinga, Karuti. 2016. “Devolution and the New Politics of Development in Kenya.” 
African Studies Review 59, 3: 155–67. 
The Devolution Paradigm     23 
 
Kegoro, George. 2019a. “Treasury and National Assembly Partners in Stifling 
Devolution,” Standard, June 30, 2019. 
Kegoro, George. 2019b. “Unless We Right Past Wrongs, NLC Will Remain Toothless 
Dog.” Standard, February 24, 2019. 
Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC). 2018. Damned Dams: Exposing Corporate 
and State Impunity in the Solai Tragedy. Nairobi: KHRC, 2018. Accessed December 
12, 2018. https://www.khrc.or.ke/publications/187-damned-dam-exposing-
corporate-and-state-impunity-in-the-solai-tragedy/file.html.  
“Kenya’s Most Corrupt Counties Revealed.” Standard, May 20, 2018. 
Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Kwach, Julie. No date. “Challenges Facing Devolution in Kenya.” 
(https://www.tuko.co.ke/264362-challenges -facing-devolution-kenya.html#264362 
last accessed December 18, 2018) 
Lasswell, Harold. 1950. Politics Who Gets What When How? New York: Peter Smith. 
Levy, Jacob. 2007. “Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties.” American 
Political Science Review 101, 3: 459–77. 
Maina, Wachira. 2019. State Capture: Inside Kenya’s Inability to Fight Corruption. 
Nairobi, Kenya: AFRICOG (African Centre for Open Governance), 2019. 
https://africog. org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/STATE-CAPTURE.pdf 
Mairu, Patrick. 2018. “Measuring Devolution in Kenya; What We Need to Know, First!” 
International Institute for Legislative Affairs, March 16, 2018, 1–10. Accessed 
December 20, 2018. https://ilakenya.org/measuring-devolution-in-kenya-what-we-
need-to-know-first. 
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy 
of Late Colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Manby, Bronwyn. 2009. The Struggle for Citizenship in Africa. New York and London: 
Zed Books. 
Mitullah, Winnie. 2016. “Citizen Response Points to Appreciation and Challenges of 
Kenya’s Devolved Governance” Afro-barometer Dispatch 105, June 30 2016. 
Accessed December 12, 2018. http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad105-citizen-
response-points-appreciation-challenges-kenyas-devolved-governance.  
Mueller, Susanne. 1984. “Government and Opposition in Kenya.” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 22, 3: 399–427. 
24     Susanne Mueller 
 
Mueller, Susanne. 2008. “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis.” Journal of Eastern 
African Studies 2, 2: 185–210. 
Mueller, Susanne. Forthcoming. “High Stakes Ethnic Politics.” In Nic Cheeseman, Karuti 
Kanyinga, and Gabrielle Lynch, eds. The Oxford Handbook on Kenya. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Mueller, Susanne. 2014. “The Resilience of the Past: Government and Opposition in 
Kenya.” Canadian Journal of African Studies 48, 2: 333–52. 
Mueller, Susanne. 2018. Interviews, Nairobi, Kenya. 
Muhindi, Susan. 2018. “Kenya Still Among the Most Corrupt Transparency Index 
Reports.” The Star, February 23, 2018. 
Mutavi, Lillian. 2018.”Financial Times Cites Makueni as a Success Story in Devolution.” 
The Star. July 2. (https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018-07-02-financial-times-cites-
makueni-as-success-story-in-devolution/) 
Mwangi, Melanie. “MCSs’ Greed, Stunts Fuel Idea to Scrap County Assemblies.” The 
Star, December 26, 2018. 
Ngugi, Tee. 2017.”Will Greedy MCAs, who were meant to save us destroy us instead?” 
The East African, May 25, 2017. 
North, Douglass. 1984. “Economic Change Through Time.” American Economic 
Review 84, 3: 359–68. 
Nyabira, Ben Christopher, and Zemelak Ayitenew Ayele. 2016. “The State of Political 
Inclusion of Ethnic Communities under Kenya’s Devolved System.” Law Democracy 
and Development 20: 131–53. 
Oates, Wallace. 1999. “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.” Journal of Economic Literature 
37: 1120–1149 
Oates, Wallace. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Olken, Benjamin A. 2010. “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a 
Field Experiment in Indonesia.” American Political Science Review 104, 2: 243–67. 
Oloo, Otieno Michael. 2014. “Devolving Corruption? Kenya’s Transition to Devolution: 
Experiences and Lessons from the Decade of the Constituency Development Fund 
in Kenya” in Conference Proceedings No. 2, Swedish International Centre for Local 
Development, Nairobi Safari Club, 2–6 June 2014, 63–74. 
Oruko, Ibrahim. 2018. “Senate hits back at National Assembly as turf wars surge.”  
Daily Nation. July 26.  
The Devolution Paradigm     25 
 
Qian, Yingyi and Barry Weingast. 1997. “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving 
Market Incentives.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 4: 83–92. 
Ribot, Jesse C., Arun Agrawal, and Anne M. Larson. 2005. “Recentralizing While 
Decentralizing: How National Government Reappropriate Forest Resources” World 
Development 34, 11: 1864–86. 
Rodden, Jonathan and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 1997. “Does Federalism Preserve 
Markets?” Virginia Law Review 83, 7: 1521–72. 
Rodriguez-Pose, Andrés and Vassilis Tselios. 2019. “Well-Being, Political 
Decentralization and Governance Quality in Europe.” Journal of Human 
Development and Capabilities 20, 1: 69–93. 
Sait, Edward M. 1938. Political Institutions: A Preface. New York and London: D. 
Appleton-Century Company. 
Scott-Villiers, Patta. 2017. “Small Wars in Marsabit County: Devolution and Political 
Violence in Northern Kenya.” Conflict, Security & Development 17, 3: 247–64. 
Sheely, Ryan. 2018. Unpublished field notes.  
Steeves, Jeffrey. 2015. “Devolution in Kenya: Derailed or on Track.” Commonwealth 
and Comparative Studies 54, 4: 457–74. 
Tiebout, Charles. 1956. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political 
Economy 64, 5: 416–24 
Tordoff, William. 1999. “Decentralization: Comparative Experience in Commonwealth 
Africa.” Journal of Modern African Studies 32, 4: 555–80.  
Transparency International. 2018. Corruption Perception Index. Accessed January 9, 
2019. https://www.transparency.org/country/KEN.  
Treisman, Daniel. 2007. The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Decentralization. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2017. “Devolution and 
County Capacity in Kenya: An Assessment of 22 Counties.”  Unpublished report. 
Waddilove, Hannah. 2019. “Support or Subvert? Assessing Devolution’s Effect on 
Central Power during Kenya’s 2017 Presidential Rerun.” Journal of Eastern African 
Studies, 13, 2: 334–52. 
Waikenda, Machel. 2018. “Devolution Has Transformed Kenya.” The Star, April 24, 
2018. 
26     Susanne Mueller 
 
Wanjiri, Rose. 2014. “Local Revenue Mobilization at the Country Level: Experiences 
and Challenges” in Conference Proceedings No. 2, Swedish International Centre for 
Local Development, Nairobi Safari Club, 2-6 June 2014, 42–50. 
Weingast, Barry. 1995. “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development.” Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 11: 1–31.  
Weingast, Barry. 2014. “Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of 
Decentralization and Economic Development.” World Development 53: 14–25. 
Wolf, Thomas. 2010. “Kenya’s New Constitution: Triumph in Hand: Testing Times 
Ahead.” Judiciary Watch Report 9: 23–94. 
World Bank. 2016. “Citizen Engagement in Kenya’s Young Decentralization.” Citizen 
Engagement Workshop Session on Kenya’s Decentralization Program, Global 
partnership for Social Accountability Forum, Kenya, May 19, 2016. Accessed 
December 19, 2018. https://slideplayer.com/slide/11484008/. 
World Bank. 2014. The Evolution of Kenya’s Devolution: What’s Working Well, What 
Could Work Better. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Ziblatt, Daniel. 2004. “Rethinking the Origins of Federalism” World Politics 57, 1: 70–98. 
 
